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CONTRACTUAL STRUCTURES AND 
PAYOFF PATTERNS OF SUKŪK 
SECURITIES
Meysam Safari
SEGi University, Malaysia 
_______________________________________________________________
Abstract
This paper is about the six different Sukūk securities, which originated in 1990s, 
and are now traded in some 11 markets as the new debt-like securities classed 
under Islamic finance. The outstanding value of these contracts is estimated to 
be US $850 billion. This paper proposes a classification for Sukūk contracts 
as pure debt, equity-based, and asset-backed based on the intrinsic nature and 
purpose of fund-raising. This classification has more practical use compared to 
existing classifications. Further, the contract peculiarities of the six instruments 
(mudārabah, mushārakah, murābahah, ijārah, salam, and istisnāh) are carefully 
specified for the first time. To start a discussion on how the economic behavior 
may be modeled for theory building, the potential cash flow pattern of each type 
of Sukūk contracts is specified. The paper aims to contribute to advanced studies 
by specifying the basic behavioral characteristics. 
Key words: Bond-like socially responsible funding; Sukūk certificates; people; 
planet before profits; Islamic finance; special purpose company; asset-backed 
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1. Introduction
Sukūk is the plural form of Sakk, which in Arabic means legal instrument, deed, 
or check.1 It was used in pre-Islamic era as a withdrawal certificate (a form of 
check) on deposits in financial firms or authorized financial merchants, much 
like the modern day cheques. Later, these certificates became instrument for 
trading as bills; and then, it became debt instruments traded among willing 
holders. Although it is reported that the Turkish Empire used sukūk to finance 
re-development of infrastructures after the devastating wars during 11th-13th 
centuries, the modern version of sukūk came into market only in 1990 in Malaysia 
1  During the 3rd century AD, financial firms in Persia (currently known as Iran) and other territories 
in the Persian Sassanid Dynasty issued letters of credit known as “chak” (Kharazmi, 1895). In 
post-Islamic Arabic documents this word has been transformed into “ṣakk” (Floor, 1990).
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with a RM125 million (equivalent to USD33 million) issued by a private firm.2 
Publicly traded issues saw its debut in 2000: the market has now six different 
sukūk, each designed for a different funding need of private and public issuers. 
The market is estimated to have an outstanding value of about US$850 billion 
as of 2011, and is growing at about 15-20 percent a year, mostly in Islamic 
countries of which Malaysia has two-thirds of the value (see Ariff, Iqbal, & 
Shamsher, 2012).
The rest of the paper is organized into six sections. In the next section, 
readers will find a description of the economic-cum-financial behavior resulting 
from the use of dramatically different principles in originating, issuing, trading 
and payoff patterns of these new market participants. Section 3 discusses about 
various types of sukūk and provides a classification in this regard. Sections 4 
reviews each type of ṣukūk in some detail. The paper ends with a conclusion on 
section 5. 
2.  Sukūk, New Instruments Resulting in New Behavior 
Currently, sukūk are considered as Islamic funding certificates, although similar 
instruments existed prior to seventh century. The contract allows businesses 
to borrow funds in a manner compliant with Islamic principles (i.e., Sharī’ah). 
Compliance with important ethical and societal restrictions are required 
for approval by a special ethics body at the regulatory institutions: sukūk 
instruments promise to pay out of profits of the funding at the business, and not 
as a guaranteed interest payment; funds are prohibited to be used for a number 
of purposes considered anti-social (gambling, prostitution, drugs, cigarettes, 
alcohol etc.); assets of borrower are transferred to a special purpose company 
which is created and controlled by the lenders. Hence, sukūk is somewhat like 
socially responsible investment firms that put people and planet before profits.3
Sukūk structures are designed based on the purpose and conditions 
of financing needs, and are not (as in conventional borrowing) general 
purpose borrowing. Therefore, sukūk is a financial instrument with complex 
characteristics. It may even have some features of common equity (in which 
case it is termed as mushārakah, which is share-like funding effort but with 
a finite period over which the sukūk holders would receive their money back 
with a share of profits. Another more common sukūk is mudārabah, a form of 
2  For further reading refer to (Adam & Thomas, 2004; Jalil, 2005; Dusuki, 2009; Vishwanath & 
Azmi, 2009; Shaikh, 2010; Wan Abdullah, Roudaki, & Clark, 2010)
3 Over the last 45 years there has been slow growth of mutual and private funds that subscribe to 
socially responsible investments and they put people and planet before profit as their motto. There 
are about 470 of such funds managing about US$400 billion. The sukūk contracts likewise pro-
hibit investments in certain goods/areas.  The difference between the two is that the use of funds 
from sukūk is priced using profit-sharing or some variations of it, and are not based on paying a 
pre-agreed fixed interest irrespective of the outcome of the use of funds. In this manner, a single 
behavior is encouraged, namely that the investors and the firm agree to share in the risk of the 
investments (hence a profit share) while the firm has to give ownership of part of the assets to the 
lender, which restricts unlimited borrowing by the businesses.
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borrowing closer to common debt but with periodic profit shares specified ahead 
of contracts. Another form is asset-backed loans (ijārah, murābahah, or others). 
For instance, one may issue an ijārah sukūk, which is a lease agreement while 
another business may issue istisnāh sukūk as project finance. Therefore, there are 
various forms of sukūk contracts with peculiar risk factors and payback schemes 
all tied to the purpose for which the funding is raised.
In Europe, high net worth individuals are brought together by financial 
institutions to organize private lending via sukūk contracts for long term 
investments in energy sector for example, on the basis of profit shares, which 
yield higher returns to investors. Similar contracts are drawn up in several 
financial centers which have set up regulatory framework to tap into the high 
net worth individuals especially in the Persian Gulf region to raise much needed 
capital for private sector. The outstanding value of private sector non-traded 
sukūk is unknown, although press reports indicate that the size of this market is 
as big as the public-traded market in 11 countries.    
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI, 2004) defined sukūk as “certificates of equal value representing, after 
closing subscription, receipt of the value of the certificates and putting it to 
use as planned, common title to shares and rights in tangible assets, usufructs 
and services, or equity of a given project or equity of a special investment 
activity”. International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) (2010) defined sukūk as 
a commercial paper that provides an investor with ownership in an underlying 
asset. It is asset-backed trust certificates evidencing ownership of an asset or 
its usufruct. It has a stable income and complies with the principle of Sharī”ah. 
Unlike conventional bonds, sukūk needs to have an underlying tangible 
asset transaction either in ownership or in a master lease agreement. Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB) (2009) definition of sukūk is “sukūk (plural 
of sakk), frequently referred to as “Islamic bonds”, are certificates with each 
Sakk representing a proportional undivided ownership right in tangible assets, 
or a pool of predominantly tangible assets, or a business venture (such as a 
murārabah). These assets may be in a specific project or investment activity in 
accordance with Sharī’ah rules and principles”. IFSB definition of sukūk differs 
from conventional interest-based securities (i.e., bonds) in a number of ways, 
including:
•	 The funds raised through the issuance of sukūk should be applied to 
investment in specified assets rather than for general unspecified purposes. 
This implies that identifiable assets should provide the basis for sukūk.
•	 Since the sukūk are backed by real underlying assets transferred with 
lenders owning pro-rata shares, income generated by the assets must be 
related to the purpose for which the funding is used. 
•	 The sukūk certificate represents a proportionate ownership right over the 
assets in which the funds are being invested. The ownership rights are 
transferred, for a fixed period ending with the maturity date of the sukūk, 
from the original owner (the originator) to the sukūk holders.
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Local authorities of Islamic countries such as Qatar Financial Center 
(QFC)4 require the authorized firms to comply with international definition, 
while some others define sukūk in their own way, as in Malaysia. Securities 
Commission of Malaysia,5 which issued the ‘Guidelines on the Offering of 
Islamic Securities’, defines sukūk as “a document or certificate which represents 
the value of an asset”. Liquidity Management Center (LMC) in Bahrain defines 
sukūk as “a certificate of equal value representing undivided shares in ownership 
of tangible assets, usufruct, and services or (in the ownership of) the asset of 
particular projects or investment activity”.6
Finally, some authors such as Ariff, Safari, and Shamsher (2012) define 
sukūk contracts as “a funding (debt) arrangement agreed to between a party 
providing the funds (investor) and the counterparty (a government or a firm or 
an individual) borrowing the funds for the purposes of using the funds to engage 
only in permissible economic production/services.”
As these definitions imply, there is no time-horizon specification for 
sukūk. In other words, sukūk may be issued for long term financing as well as 
short term financing. Short term sukūk with maturities as short as one month are 
issued by various issuers. Some of the earliest short term sukūk are the 30- and 
91-days salam sukūk issued by Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA)7 in 2001. Bank 
Negara Malaysia (BNM)8 also issues one-year short-term ijārah sukūk. Since 
1994, BNM has introduced Islamic Interbank Money Market (IIMM) sukūk as 
a short term intermediary to provide a ready source of short-term investment 
outlets based on Islamic principles. Although IIMM works under the concept 
of debt-like murārabah financing, they have not issued sukūk for this specific 
purpose.
3.  Classification of Different Types of  Sukūk
In the course of conducting their businesses, companies require funds to initiate, 
operate, promote, and expand their businesses (same applies to conventional 
firms). This need is addressed either from internal or external sources. 
External financing could be obtained by issuing new equity-share certificates 
(infinite-period mushārakah) as a financial instrument in the same manner as 
conventional counterparts do through issuing common stocks. This also can 
be achieved by issuing funding certificates (sukūk) as an Islamic finite-period 
“loan” for productive uses of funds. The distinguishing factor between sukūk 
and conventional financing lies in the borrowing process. sukūk should not deal 
4 Qatar Financial Center (QFC) in the Islamic Finance Rulebook (IFSI) under section IFSI 6.2.2 
requires the authorized firm to comply with the AAOIFI standards.
5  Securities Commission Malaysia Website: http://www.sc.com.my/main.asp?pageid=448, ac-
cessed on 17/07/2012
6  Obtained from LMC documents at http://www.lmcbahrain.com/pdf/about-ṣukūk.pdf, accessed on 
17/07/2012
7 In 2006, renamed as Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB).
8  Central Bank of Malaysia.
International Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 7
Contractual Structures and Payoff Patterns of Sukuk Secutities: 67-93                  71
in payment or receipt of ribā. Instead they use profit shares. The debt contract 
specifies the sharing of risk of the business with a promise of reward that is not 
fixed. It is variable and depends on the amount of profits. 
Sukūk offer many ways to acquire funds via debt. The most important 
requirement is that the pure debt certificates are not tradable at any price but the 
face value of the debt while the other two forms of debt to be described later 
could be traded.
Mudārabah and mushārakah are called the primary modes of sukūk 
(Chapra, 1998) because they are based on the profit-loss sharing (PLS). 
(However, due to severe asymmetric information problem of these contracts, 
these two forms of Islamic financial instruments funds less than 10 per cent of all 
funds.)  In PLS methods, the outcome of investment is completely based on the 
performance of the project and hence, is not predetermined. The predetermined 
factors are the duration of investment and the ownership in special purpose 
firm or distribution ratio of profit of the project. In contrast to PLS methods, 
in secondary methods of financing, the outcome of investment for investors is 
to some extent predetermined and is not fully tied to the performance of the 
investment project. For instance, in an ijārah lease contract, the investor will 
benefit from a predetermined rental (i.e., lease) fees for a certain period of time. 
However in the secondary modes of finance, the principal investment should not 
be guaranteed by the issuer. 
Present literature provides two types of classification for sukūk. First 
classification is based on issuer type: sovereign sukūk (government, quasi-
government) and corporate sukūk. Second classification is based on contract 
forms, including but not limited to the six types already mentioned in this paper. 
The first two (i.e., murārabah and mushārakah) are sometimes considered as 
major or primary modes of finance because they are based on PLS method 
whereby the profit or loss arising from the project financed by the sukūk issue is 
shared among the parties according to a pre-agreed ratio.
Another classification for sukūk is based on the underlying nature of the 
financing contract and its characteristics i.e., pure debt, equity-based, or asset-
backed sukūk. As explained later, there are various contractual frameworks 
for financing in the jurisprudence applying to these. These contracts include 
mudārabah (silent partnership or capital trust) for pure-debt sukūk, mushārakah 
(full partnership or joint venture) for equity-based sukūk, and murābahah 
(procurement financing), ijārah (leasing), salam (advance payment), and 
istisnāh (financing manufacturing projects) for asset-backed sukūk. Figure 1 
depicts these modes of financing.
Each of the main categories may then, if necessary, be subcategorized 
further to accommodate various types of contracts. To accommodate various 
types of asset-backed sukūk contracts, and based on their intrinsic purpose, 
three more subcategories are suggested as property-backed (semi-collateralized) 
sukūk, advance or deferred payment sukūk, and project financing sukūk.  These 
classifications are summarized later.
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Figure 1: Sukūk based on their underlying contractual structure
4.  Sukūk Types
4.1 Mudārabah
Mudārabah sukūk are based on the murārabah contract. Mudārabah, or 
“partnership in profit”, contract is one of the premier financing methods dating 
back to pre-Islamic era. Abdul-Gafoor (2006) documented that Muhammad 
(pbuh) 9 used murārabah with Khadijah, a rich woman from Mekkah,10 about 
fifteen years prior to the dawn of Islam. Mudārabah is a contract between at 
least two parties: rabb al-māl (pl. arbāb al-māl) meaning capital owner(s), who 
provides funds and mudārib or entrepreneur who brings the entrepreneurship 
and management, in order to perform a specific activity or venture. The rabb 
al-māl or capital owner could be of any type ranging from individual investors, 
investment companies, or banks.
At the maturity of the contract or at some certain predetermined time, 
generated profits from the venture are shared between contracting parties 
according to a pre-agreed ratio. In case of loss, each party should bear the loss of 
his contribution to the venture. Hence, the capital owner should bear all financial 
losses and the entrepreneur should bear the operating losses such as time and 
effort. However, in case of negligence or misconduct by the entrepreneur, 
then, as Ibn Qudama states “the loss is a result of a misuse or violation of the 
conditions of the contract on the part of the working partner, then he alone will 
be liable to cover it” (quoted in Daryanani, 2008). Capital owner is not allowed 
to have a management role in the mudārabah venture contract. Mudārib is 
considered a trustee as well as an agent of the rabb al-māl. Mudārib, as a trustee,
9  Short form for “May Allah’s peace be upon him”.
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Figure 2: Classification of various sukūk contracts based on their financial 
characteristics
is responsible for possible losses due to the willful negligence.  Moreover, as an 
agent, mudārib is required to use and manage the capital in a way that generates 
the maximum profit for the venture (Chapra, 1998). 
Furthermore, similar to equity holders, murārabah investors’ profit is in 
line and proportionate to the performance of the firm. Ebrahim (1999) illustrates 
murārabah contract as a combination which has features of both equity and debt. 
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However, they do not benefit from all aspects of shareholders, like capital gains, 
and do not have some of their rights such as attending or voting at annual general 
meeting. On the other hand, in case of bankruptcy, sukūk holders are in a higher 
position (have preferred claims) to the equity of shareholders (Wilson, 2004). 
Although mudārabah may be applied in various economic activities, the 
majority of Islamic jurists and scholars hold the view that mudārabah contracts 
are most suitable for trading activities. In practice, however, the implication of 
mudārabah contracts is limited due to the operational difficulties and business 
ethics constraints. The inefficient tax system, high rate of illiteracy, inadequate 
accounting standards and the practice of keeping a double set of accounts on 
the part of the majority of business people are major constraints on the practical 
implementation of the PLS system in Muslim countries (Khan, 2003).
In order to issue a mudārabah sukūk a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 
company is set up. This SPV will act as rabb al-mal, or capital owner, and 
the originator will act as mudārib. Alvi et al. (2010) described the process of 
payback of mudārabah sukūk and highlighted that the proceeds of the issue 
collected by the SPV from the sukūk investors are applied as the capital of the 
mudārabah which the mudārib will manage for a share in the profits, the profit 
sharing ratio being specified at the outset. 
While there should not be a predetermined rate of return in a mudārabah 
contract, the sukūk issued until early 2008 have been designed in a way to ensure 
that sukūk holders receive the so-called indicative rate of return announced at 
the inception of the issue. Alvi et al. (2010) highlighted that they achieved this 
by including clauses in the mudārabah agreement that specified a ‘maximum’ 
rate of return. Any profit to be generated above that rate of return would be 
directed to a reserve account, which could be used to cover any shortfall in future 
years. In case of insufficient profits as well as insufficient funds in the reserve 
account, the issuing company would be required to provide Sharī’ah-compliant 
funding to meet the shortfall and make it up to the indicative rate of return, in 
effect guaranteeing the rate of return independent of the actual profit generated. 
Usmani (2007), chairman of the AAOIFI Sharī’ah Council, has ruled against the 
practice of guaranteeing the indicative rate of return.
As mentioned before, mudārabah sukūk are pure debt. In other words, by 
nature, it is mere case of borrowing money, thus, the mudārabah sukūk securities 
are not tradable. However, Alvi et al. (2010) highlighted that the mudārabah 
sukūk, in practice, are structured in a way to be tradable. Mudārabah sukūk are 
tradable and negotiable if the mudārabah assets do not comprise entirely of the 
sukūk proceeds (in which case it will be all liquid assets and cannot be traded). 
In most mudārabah sukūk, there is a combination of tangible assets and sukūk 
proceeds, plus the mudārib is allowed to mingle his own assets with those of 
the mudārabah, hence mostly meeting the Sharī’ah-compliance requirement 
of having more than 51% of the assets in tangible form for tradability and 
negotiability. 
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The simplest form of mudārabah sukūk is form of a zero-
reward11mudārabah, which does not provide any form of reward before maturity. 
The only payback that sukūk holders receive is the undetermined maturity 
payback. The pay-off structure of zero-reward mudārabah sukūk is depicted in 
Figure 3. In this diagram, the maturity payment (I`) is not predetermined and is 
based on the performance of the venture.
Figure 3: Cash flows pattern of zero-reward mudārabah sukūk
Other possible payoff structure of the mudārabah sukūk contract is 
when issuer pays periodical rewards to sukūk holders. However, based on the 
characteristics of mudārabah contract, amount of reward cash flows should not 
be predetermined and hence, must be based on the performance of the venture in 
that period. The sharing ratio is, however predetermined. Similar to zero-reward 
mudārabah sukūk, the maturity payment is also undetermined and based on the 
venture’s performance. The pay-off structure of such general mudārabah sukūk 
is depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Cash flows pattern of reward paying mudārabah sukūk
4.2 Mushārakah
11 We used the term “reward” as a substitution for interest-based term “coupon”. Reward is the 
periodical payment that the sukūk holder is entitled to receive. 
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Mushārakah is the next type. Iqbal and Molyneux (2005) defined mushārakah 
as “an arrangement where two or more parties establish a joint commercial 
enterprise and all contribute capital as well as labor and management as a general 
rule”. In contrast to Mudārabah contract, mushārakah investors have the right 
to participate in management of the business partnership, however, this right is 
entrusted to each investor (Shinsuke, 2007). It could be derived that mushārakah 
contract may require establishment of a new partnership or company, where 
mushārakah contract parties are the participants and owners (Wilson, 
2004). Mushārakah sukūk could be issued based on such financing concept. 
Mushārakah type of equity finance demands that both profit ratio and length of 
the joint venture agreement is decided in advance. Similar to mudārabah, loss is 
shared in proportion to the capital contribution unless the loss is proven to be due 
to negligence of one party (Daryanani, 2008). Therefore, all profits and losses 
generated from the mushārakah are shared among the parties on the basis of the 
pre-agreed ratio. 
As a result, mushārakah is basically suitable for financing private or 
public companies and projects and is also practiced by Islamic banks, where it is 
typically performed through joint ventures between banks and business firms for 
a certain operation (Gait & Worthington, 2007). Mushārakah, due to its nature 
and advantages in providing equal (but proportionate) benefits for all parties, has 
support of all Islamic scholars and is valid under Sharī’ah principles. However, 
El-Gamal (2000) suggests that parties to mushārakah usually need the help of 
legal expert to ensure that any potential ribā or gharar is carefully avoided. On 
the discussion about mushārakah contracts, Chapra (1998, p. 7) concluded that 
“The only requirement of the Sharī’ah would be justice, which would imply that 
the proportional shares of partners in profit must reflect the contribution made 
to the business by their capital, skill, time, management ability, goodwill and 
contacts. Anything otherwise would not only shatter one of the most important 
pillars of the Islamic value system, but also lead to dissatisfaction and conflict 
among the partners and destabilize the partnership. The losses must, however, 
be shared in proportion to capital contribution and the stipulation of any other 
proportion would be ultra vires and unenforceable.”
Lewis and Algaoud (2001) suggested two ways to perform a mushārakah 
contact. However, both types are based on the same general concept of 
mushārakah, where its parties (capital owner and entrepreneur) are ensured an 
equitable share in the profit or loss on pre-agreed terms. The difference lies in 
the pre-agreed sharing ratio. In the first method, this pre-agreed ratio is fixed 
and non-changeable for the whole period of the contract while in the second 
type, the ratio is declining. The diminishing, or declining mushārakah contract is 
preferred by some financiers since it allows them to release their capital from the 
investment by reducing its equity share each year and receiving periodic profits 
based on the remaining share balance. On the other hand, the equity share of the 
entrepreneur increases over time to the extent that he or she becomes the sole 
owner of the firm.
There are varieties of sukūk based on the mushārakah contracts. Sukūk 
based on diminishing mushārakah are gaining momentum since they enable 
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Islamic banks or Sharī’ah-compliant investment companies to provide up-front 
investment funding to the issuer. In this regard, both parties establish a Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to administer the sukūk. In order to issue a diminishing 
mushārakah sukūk, the issuer transfers the ownership of an asset to the SPV to 
enter the partnership agreement. On the other hand, investors enter the agreement 
by paying cash. Therefore, both the investors and the issuer are equity partners 
in the SPV. However, the investors share in the SPV diminishes over time as the 
issuer pays installments to investors to repurchase their respective share in the 
asset. These installment payments plus the issuer’s rental payments for use of 
asset (i.e., asset’s generated income) constitute the cash flow stream for sukūk-
holders. In fixed-ratio mushārakah sukūk, the cash flow stream for the sukūk-
holder is only constituted from the income generated from the asset and not the 
installment part. The structure of diminishing mushārakah sukūk is depicted in 
the Figure 5.
Figure 5: Diminishing mushārakah sukūk structure 
Flexibility in payments schedule and amounts has made diminishing 
mushārakah sukūk more convenient to use. However, it should be highlighted 
that all arrangements should be agreed upon ex-ante by all parties to the SPV. 
The payments are usually monthly or quarterly, but not necessarily in equal 
amounts (Wilson, 2008). Smaller installments could be made during the initial 
period of the sukūk, with most of the asset value or SPV capital remaining with 
the investors, but the amount of the installment payments could increase in a 
linear fashion, or according to some predetermined formula. As the issuer’s 
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might be expected to decrease due to the decline in remaining share. However, 
this does not necessarily have to be the case, especially if there is capital 
appreciation in the value of the asset. In other words when installment and rental 
payments are aggregated, they might be constant, diminishing or increasing over 
time, provided both parties agree to the formula used and the documentation is 
transparent.
The simplest payoff structure of mushārakah sukūk contract is the form 
of zero-reward fixed mushārakah sukūk which does not provide any form of 
reward during its tenure. The only cash flow that sukūk holders receive is the 
undetermined maturity payback. Its cash flow structure is the same as the zero-
reward mudārabah sukūk and is depicted in the Figure 6. The amount of maturity 
payment (I`) is undetermined and should be based on the venture’s performance.
Figure 6: Cash flows pattern of zero-reward mushārakah sukūk
Another possible payoff structure of the fixed mushārakah sukūk 
contract is when issuer pays periodical rewards to sukūk holders. However, based 
on the characteristics of mushārakah contract, amount of cash flows should not 
be predetermined and hence, must be based on the performance of the venture. 
Similar to zero-reward mushārakah sukūk, the maturity payment (i.e., I’ in the 
diagram) is also undetermined and based on the venture’s performance. The 
pay-off structure of such fixed mushārakah sukūk is depicted in Figure 7. In this 
figure, Ri is the periodical reward payment distributed among sukūk holders, 
which is based on the actual performance of the venture in each period.
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Diminishing mushārakah ṣukūk contract governs the mushārakah 
contract where the profit ratio of the capital owner declines over time, eventually 
reaching zero at the maturity time. The periodical payments, then, constitute from 
two parts; reward and portion of original equity capital. The periodical payment, 
in this case, could be engineered in various ways. First possible cash flow pattern 
may be the case where the periodical payment is fixed at a certain amount. The 
pay-off structure of such diminishing mushārakah sukūk is depicted in Figure 
8. In this figure, Ri is the periodical payment distributed among ṣukūk holders, 
which is sum of reward amount (based on the actual performance of the venture 
in that period) and the portion of original capital paid back to the capital owners.
Figure 8: Cash flows pattern of diminishing mushārakah Ṣukūk with fixed-
amount periodical payments
Periodical payments in Diminishing mushārakah sukūk contract could 
be designed in a way that the periodical payment amounts follow a constant 
growth model over its tenure. The pay-off structure of such diminishing 
mushārakah sukūk is depicted in Figure 9. In this figure, Ri is the periodical 
payment distributed among sukūk holders, which is sum of reward amount 
(based on the actual performance of the venture in that period) and the portion of 
original capital paid back to the capital owners.
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4.3 Murābahah
Murābabah is the third type used for sukūk. Murābahah contracts govern the 
process of buying, purchasing, or importing an item by one party, mainly an 
Islamic bank, and then reselling it to other party. The markup is the bank’s 
profit for funding this transaction (Gait & Worthington, 2007). Islamic banks’ 
benefit is generated from the markup on the cost of purchase of the goods which 
is agreed upon in advance (Metwally, 2006; Shinsuke, 2007). Murābahah 
contracts, which are based on a cost-plus basis, are especially used for foreign 
trade and working capital financing for circumstances in which banks purchase 
raw materials, goods or equipment and sell them to the customer (Lewis, 2007). 
Daryanani (2008) highlighted the fact that the ownership of the murābahah 
asset remains with the Islamic bank until all payments are settled, in contrast 
to the conventional system where the ownership of the assets is immediately 
transferred to the buyer. Therefore, from modern finance point of view, it is 
equivalent to an asset-backed risky loan and is a popular substitute for interest-
based conventional trade financing in Islamic Banks.
To initiate the murābahah, the customer provides the detailed specification 
and prices of the required goods to be purchased or imported to the bank. Having 
received the application documents, the Islamic bank, analyzes and collects the 
required information from the vendors, especially on the price and payment 
conditions, then, the bank and murābahah-applier agree on the terms of the deal 
and finally, the bank purchases the goods or commodities and resell them to the 
customer. In order to conduct a murābahah contract, following requirements 
should be met (Obaidullah, 2005):
i) Goods and commodities mentioned in the contract must be classified, 
clearly identified according to commonly accepted standards and must 
exist at the time of sale;
ii) Islamic financier must hold the ownership of the goods at the time of sale 
to the buyer;
iii) The cost in terms of net purchase price and the markup must be known 
at the time of sale and be declared to the customer. In other words, if 
the bank succeeds in price reduction by obtaining a discount from the 
vendor; this discount should be shared with the customer;
iv) Schedule for delivery of goods, as well as payments must be specified in 
the contract and cannot be changed in the life of the contract.
v) Murābahah contract must be based on sale of commodity or tangible 
goods and cannot be based on sale of money.
Khan and Bhatti (2008) claimed that the murābahah contracts constitute 
the majority (54 percent) of the total financing and investment portfolios of ten 
largest Islamic banks during the 2004-2006 period. However, murābahah was 
more popular a decade before, 1994-1996, by 65 percent (Iqbal, 1998).
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Murābahah contracts typically have short term maturities. Hence, 
Islamic banks basically use murābahah for short-term investment and liquidity 
management. However, murābahah contracts have low returns, leading to 
an inefficient use of funds and lower rate of return for Islamic banks (Abdul 
Majid, 2003). The way murābahah contracts conducted in practice contradicts 
with Sharī’ah principles because Islamic banks transfer all costs of insurance 
of murābahah goods against possible risks of damage, destruction, and theft 
to the murābahah customer (Bashir, 1999). Islamic banks also perform some 
other actions that are not Sharī’ah compliant such as benchmarking interest 
rate to fix the returns on murābahah, assigning higher markups for murābahah 
contracts with longer periods, charging fines to customers who delay installment 
payments, and recovering losses from customers who breach their promises to 
buy the murābahah goods (Homoud, 1994).
Murābahah contract, by itself, is only a contract of appointing bank as 
an agent, on behalf of customer, in the process of purchase of goods and do not 
necessary involve in financing the purchase (Obaidullah, 2005). In other words, 
in the basic murābahah contract, customer should pay the cost of goods and the 
profit margin immediately after the delivery of goods. However, the customer 
can pay by deferred installments (Bay bi thaman al-ājal) or a deferred lump sum 
without an increase over the original value (Bay bi thaman al-ājal). 
With a murābahah sukūk an Islamic bank securitizes its trading 
transactions with a proportion of the fixed markup providing the return to the 
sukūk investor, and the bank using the repayment from its trading client to repay 
the sukūk holder on termination of the contract (Wilson, 2008).
Bay mu’ajjal- murābahah sukūk is the case where issuer pays back the 
total amount borrowed at a certain time in a predetermined lump sum payment. 
Payback structure of bay mu’ajjal - murābahah sukūk would only have a maturity 
payment (I`) that constitutes the original amount plus the predetermined markup 
as shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Cash flows pattern of bay mu’ajjal- murābahah sukūk
Bay bi thaman al-ājal sukūk is the case where issuer pays back the total 
amount borrowed in deferred installments. Payback structure of bay bi thaman 
al-ājal sukūk can be in two types. In first type, periodical payments are equal and 
fixed in amount and maturity payment (I`) is predetermined. Cash flows of this 
form of bay bi thaman al-ājal sukūk is depicted in Figure 11.
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Another type for payback structure of bay bi thaman al-ājal sukūk 
is where the periodical payments follow a growth model over its tenure. The 
growth pattern, as well as the initial periodical payment amount, should be 
predetermined.
Figure 11: Cash flows pattern of bay bi thaman al-ājal sukūk with fixed-amount 
reward
As the general rule of murābahah Sukūk, the maturity payment is also known in 
advance. The cash flows diagram of this payback structure is depicted in Figure 
12.
Figure 12: Cash flows pattern of bay bi thaman al-ājal sukūk with growing-
reward
4.4  Ijārah
Ijārah or lease contract is another form based on rent-like payments. Ijārah, 
which means “to give something on rent” (Lewis & Algaoud, 2001), is the 
reward or recompense that proceeds from a rental contract between two parties, 
where the lessor (the owner of the asset) leases capital asset to the lessee (the 
user of the asset) (Gait & Worthington, 2007). There is a tendency toward lease 
financing (ijārah) in Islamic banking sector, since it promises higher yields than 
trade finance (murābahah) and also has longer financing horizons, which is an 
important feature for business investments (Daryanani, 2008).
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To be a compliant contract, the ijārah contract should satisfy some 
conditions. The primary requirement is that the lessor must be a real owner and in 
possession of the asset to be leased under contract. As a result, the lessor should 
solely bear all risks and uncertainties associated to the asset and be responsible 
for all damage, repair, insurance, and depreciation of the asset (Khan and Bhatti, 
2008). It could be inferred that charging rental payment is not allowed until the 
lessee actually receives the possession of the asset and shall pay the rental only 
as long as it is in usable condition. Moreover, in case of manufacturing defects 
which are beyond the lessee’s control, the lessor is responsible. However, the 
lessee is responsible for the proper upkeep and maintenance of the leased asset. 
The intention of posing such restriction in ijārah contract by Sharī’ah is to protect 
both parties to the contract by reducing the uncertainty and ambiguity from the 
agreement (Wilson, 2004). In addition to that, both lessor and lessee should be 
clear on purpose of ijārah and the usage of assets, moreover, the ijārah purpose 
must comply with Sharī’ah (Al-Omar & Abdel-Haq, 1996). 
There are two forms of leasing contracts, or ijārah, in Islamic finance. 
Ijārah, or direct leasing contract, is the case where the lessee uses the capital 
asset owned by the lessor, with his/her permission, for a specific period of time 
for a monthly or annually rental fee. The owner bears the ownership title for 
the whole contract period and should perform the ownership responsibilities 
such as insurance and maintenance (Zaher & Hassan, 2001). In ijārah contract 
possession in asset should be transferred back to the owner after the contract 
matures. In other words, in pure ijārah contracts, there is no option to transfer 
the ownership of the asset at maturity. 
Ijārah wa iqtinā’, or hire purchase, is the case of contract where the 
basic intention is transferring the ownership after completing the leasing period. 
Ijārah wa iqtinā’ is popularly practiced when Islamic bank purchases equipment 
or some other capital asset based on the request of an individual or institutional 
customer and then rents it to the customer for a certain fixed rent. On the 
other hand, the customer promises to purchase the equipment or asset within a 
specified period to transfer the ownership from the Islamic bank to the customer 
(Al-Jarhi & Iqbal, 2001). However, it should be noted that the lease contract is 
completely separate and independent from the contract of purchase of residuals, 
which has to be valued on a market-basis and cannot be fixed in advance. The 
purchase contract should be an optional, non-binding contract because the 
quality and the market price of the asset at the end of the lease period are unclear 
(Chapra, 1998). One other approach is the case where the ownership is gradually 
transferred to the customer. In this case, and in addition to the regular rental 
payment, the customer shall pay installments of the value of the asset in order to 
reduce the ownership share of the lessor in the asset until the ownership is fully 
transferred to the lessee (Metwally, 2006). Ijārah wa iqtinā’, having a strong 
support from Sharī’ah scholars, is widely used in the real estate, retail, industry, 
and manufacturing sectors (Iqbal, 1998). 
Ijārah sukūk is based on the ijārah contract. In order to issue ijārah 
sukūk, the originator, who primarily owns the assets, sells the assets to a Special 
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Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which is typically a company in an offshore tax-free 
site. Then the SPV leases back the assets to the issuer at a specific predetermined 
rental fee and then the SPV securitize the ownership in the assets by issuing 
ṣukūk certificates to the public investors (Lewis, 2007). These sukūk certificates 
represent an undividable share in the ownership of the assets which entitle the 
sukūk-holders to distribution of the rental payments on the underlying assets. 
However, the rental payment could be fixed or floating for the whole period, 
dependent on the leasing contract between the SPV and originator. Since these 
sukūk certificates represent ownership in real assets, they could be traded in a 
secondary market. 
The role of the SPV in conducting ijārah sukūk is the management of 
the ṣukūk cash flows, particularly receiving periodical rentals and installments 
from the originator and disbursing them to the ṣukūk-holders (Aseambankers, 
2005). Thus, after maturation of sukūk, the SPV no longer has a role and 
consequently will be ceased from existence. However, the ijārah ṣukūk is 
typically issued for periods longer than five years and could be considered as 
long term debt certificates. This may raise the issue of SPV’s default risk, so, 
the investors typically receive a direct guarantee from the issuer of the SPV 
obligations (Wilson, 2008). This guarantee also includes the obligation by the 
issuer to repurchase the asset from the SPV at the end of the ijārah contract at 
the original sale price.
Source: Adapted from Wilson (2008), Abdul Majid (2003), El-Gamal (2007), Bose and McGee 
(2008)
Figure 13: Ijārah sukūk structure 
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Wilson (2008) suggested that due to its nature, SPV does not have any of 
risks associated with banks, in other words, SPV is bankruptcy remote. In other 
words, if the issuer faces the bankruptcy, the creditors to the issuer cannot claim 
the assets held by the SPV or otherwise interfere with the rights of the sukūk-
holders with respect to the underlying assets (Gurgey & Keki, 2008). As a result, 
SPV would be attractive to both issuers and investors, and this may justify the 
relatively high legal establishment costs. 
Kamali (2007) claimed that due to the fixed and predetermined nature 
of rental cash flow, the ijārah sukūk-holders receive steady income that is even 
more risk averse than common stocks. However, he mentioned general market 
conditions, price movements of real assets, ability of the lessee to pay the rental 
or installments, maintenance, and insurance cost as sources of risks to the ijārah 
sukūk. He concluded that because of these risk factors, the expected return on 
some of ijārah sukūk may not be precisely predetermined and fixed. Thus, the 
fixed rental may only represent a maximum that is subject to some possible 
deductions. 
The major criticism of ijārah sukūk is that the return is variable or 
floating in most cases. Moreover, this variable rate, sometimes for simplification 
reasons, is mostly benchmarked or “pegged” to an interest-based index such as 
the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) for USD based sukūk and local 
rates for other currencies. Usmani (2002) criticized this practice by associating 
ribā to this form of ijārah sukūk practice. Sharī’ah scholars suggested the usage 
of other non-interest benchmarks for pricing and evaluation purposes. In order 
to overcome the ribā issue, government or sovereign sukūk could be assessed by 
macroeconomic indicators and corporate sukūk could be assessed based on the 
company performance indicators. 
Ijārah sukūk can have various types of payback structure. In the 
simplest form, ijārah sukūk payback could be as fixed reward payments and 
an undetermined maturity payment. The formal ijārah contract does not have 
the option for parties to transfer the ownership of the asset at the end of the 
period. Thus, at the end of an ijārah contract, the asset should be returned to the 
owner (i.e. capital owner or the SPV). In order to transfer the ownership back 
to the issuer at the maturity, one should use ijārah wa iqtina’ contract. Ijārah 
wa iqtinā’ sukūk is form of ijārah contract where the ownership of the asset will 
be transferred to lessee (i.e. issuer) at the maturity of the sukūk. However, the 
maturity payment is not determined at the issuance time of sukūk. The valuation 
of the asset in ijārah wa iqtinā’ sukūk should be conducted at the maturity time, 
when the market value of the asset is recognized and maturity payment (I’) is set 
to be equal to the market value at that point in time. Such cash flow pattern is 
depicted in Figure 14. In this diagram, Ri is the periodical reward payments that 
is fixed and predetermined and I’ is the undetermined maturity payment. 
Rewards in ijārah sukūk contracts may follow a growth model over its 
tenure to compensate the actual increase of the rental fees in the market during 
this period. This form of payback structure might be more practical in long term 
ijārah sukūk securities. The payback structure of this form of sukūk contract 
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Figure 14: Cash flows pattern of ijārah sukūk with fixed-amount periodical 
reward payment and undetermined maturity payment
is illustrated in the Figure 15. In this form of contract, the amount of maturity 
payment (I`) is undetermined and will be determined only at the maturity time 
based on the actual market value of the asset. The amount of reward payments 
(Ri) are predetermined and set to follow a growing pattern. 
Figure 15: Cash flows pattern of ijārah sukūk with growing-reward payments 
and undetermined maturity payment
4.5  Salam
Salam contract refers to a sale where a seller promises to supply a specific 
commodity to a buyer at a future date in return for an advanced price, paid in full 
on the spot. Sale of goods that are not currently under ownership and possession 
of the seller or do not exist at the contract time is generally prohibited because 
of extreme uncertainty (gharar). However, salam and istisnāh (manufacturing 
project finance) contracts are exceptions to this general ruling which facilitate 
financing process of agricultural and industrial projects under certain conditions. 
Iqbal and Molyneux (2005) defined salam as: “salam is a sale contract in which 
the price is paid in advance at the time of contracting against delivery of the 
purchased goods/services at a specified future date”. In order to be Sharī’ah-
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compliant, a salam contract should comply with these following requirements 
(Gait & Worthington, 2007).
i) The commodities and goods have not came into existence at the time of 
the contract.
ii) The quality and quantity of goods must be known at the time of contract.
iii) The delivery schedule and venue must be determined at the contracting 
time. 
iv) Buyer must pay the entire price of goods in advance to the seller at the 
time of contract.
Therefore, salam contract is used when buyer pays to order a specific 
product to be arranged by seller and be delivered on a certain point in time. Salam 
is an old type of contract which dates back to the pre-Islamic era when it was 
widely used especially for agricultural produce (Khan & Bhatti, 2008). Salam 
contract is approved by Sunnah. Ibn Abbas narrated: “The Messenger of Allah 
came to Madinah and found its inhabitants entering salam contracts (with the 
price paid in advance) in fruits for one, two, and three years. He said: Whoever 
enters into a salam contract let him specify a known volume or weight, and a 
known term of deferment” (El-Gamal, 2000). Moreover, in another narration 
the holy Prophet (pbuh) has said: “Whoever enters into salaf12, should stipulate 
a determined weight and measurement, and a determined date of delivery” (Al-
Masri, 2003).
Salam contract has benefitted both buyer and seller. Seller could finance 
working capital needs and buyer could benefit from the difference between 
purchase price and the commodity price at the delivery time, which tends to be 
higher. In the meantime, the purchaser can finance the advance payments by 
issuing certificates against the Salam contract’s goods, at purchase price; and, 
since these certificates represent real assets, they could be sold to the public or 
be traded in the secondary market. The return for the buyers of these certificates 
is the difference in the commodity prices at the maturity time and the discounted 
price they have paid. 
In order to issue a salam sukūk, a not-for-profit Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV) should be created as a separate legal entity for the duration of the sukūk 
to administrate the flow of payments between issuer and investors as well as 
holding the title of the underlying asset (Dommisse & Kazi, 2005). To issue 
ṣukūk, the issuer should transfer the title to the assets to the SPV, which in turn 
issues certificates of participation to the public investors. Salam sukūk represent 
an undivided right to an interest in the asset. In order to obtain these certificates 
of participation the investors should make an advance payment which entitles 
them to a future payback of the investment plus a fixed pre-agreed mark-up 
(Wilson, 2008).
One of the famous examples of salam sukūk is the “Bahrain sukūk al-
Salam” which is primarily designed to broaden the depth and liquidity of the 
Bahrain’s market. This short-term treasury-bill-type sukūk has aluminum as 
12  Salaf  has the same meaning and interpretation as of salam.
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its underlying asset (Abdul Majid, 2003). At maturity time, the issuer which 
is “Bahrain Monetary Agency” acts as a sukūk-holders’ agent and sells the 
commodity at a pre-agreed price that guarantees promised return rate to the 
sukūk-holder (El-Gamal, 2007). 
As mentioned above, in salam contracts, capital owner pays in advance 
for a commodity to be delivered in future. The capital owner (i.e., sukūk holder) 
would benefit from the difference between amount paid in advance and the 
market price of the commodity at maturity. The maturity reward (I’), thus, is 
undetermined at the issuance. The payback structure of Salam sukūk is depicted 
in Figure 17.
Source: Wilson (2008)
Figure 16: Salam sukūk structure 
Figure 17: Cash flows pattern of salam sukūk
4.6 Istisnāh
Istisnāh means manufacturing. Commission to manufacture is the proper method 
of financing working capital in the manufacturing and construction sectors (El-
Gamal, 2000). Gait and Worthington (2007) defined istisnāh as “a manufacturing 
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cash payment and deferred delivery or deferred payment and delivery”. Istisnāh 
has the cost reduction benefit for the issuer in the term that all or part of the 
working capital is obtained from external resources and consequently the final 
product is manufactured at a lower cost (Lewis & Algaoud, 2001). 
As mentioned before, sales of goods that are not currently under ownership 
and possession of the seller is generally prohibited. However, like salam, 
istisnāh, is an exception to this general ruling, which refers to a contract whereby 
manufacturer-seller agrees to produce and deliver a specific predetermined good 
in specified quantity on a given date in the future at a fixed price (Chapra, 1998). 
In contrast to salam, there is no obligation for lump sum advance payment under 
istisnāh. The price may be paid in accordance to the production progress or 
partly in advance and the rest at the time of delivery. Another distinction point 
of istisnāh contract is that the delivery time could be unknown or unspecific at 
the time of contract. Finally, the subject matter of an istisnāh contract is usually 
a commodity or item which involves manufacturing (Iqbal & Molyneux, 2005). 
Wilson (2004) explained the process of issuance of istisnāh sukūk 
and highlighted that istisnāh sukūk has also become the contractual form for 
financing construction projects. In order to issue istisnāh sukūk, a parallel 
istisnāh contract is used between financier and the actual subcontractor of 
the project. Project commissioner provides details of the technical, financial, 
and project management specifications of the project to the financier. Then, 
financier sets up a tender to find the best subcontractor for the project. Among 
all information required in the bid, they should also specify their proposal for 
selling the completed parts of the project over time and the amount of expected 
in installment payments. This stream of revenues which is based on the expected 
installments income for a specific period of time can be used for issuing the 
debt certificates. However, since the istisnāh certificates are not based on any 
real asset and are solely representing debt obligation, they are not tradable in 
secondary market at discount.
Figure 18: Cash flows pattern of istisnāh sukūk
Istisnah sukūk could only be exchanged at face value or be used to 
purchase goods or services whose price is equal to the face value of the certificate. 
However, transferring the debt contract from the financier to a supplier of goods 
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or service needs the permission of the original debtor commissioning the project 
(Wilson, 2004).
As mentioned above, in istisnāh contracts, capital owner pays in advance 
for a project to be constructed in future. The capital owner (i.e., sukūk holder) 
would benefit from the difference between amount paid in advance and the market 
price of the project at maturity. The maturity reward (I’), thus, is undetermined 
at the issuance. The payback structure of istisnāh sukūk is depicted in Figure 18.
5.  Conclusion
This paper compares various definitions of sukūk contracts and summarizes 
these definitions as a funding (debt) arrangement agreed between a party 
providing  funds (investor) and the counterparty (a government or a firm or an 
individual) borrowing the funds for the purposes of using the funds to engage 
only in permissible economic production/ services (Ariff, Safari & Shamsher, 
2012). This definition satisfies the conceptual requirements of a sukūk contracts. 
This paper also categorizes various sukūk contracts based on their intrinsic 
nature. Sukūk securities are issued for different purposes, however, they can be 
classified into three main types as: pure debt, equity-based, and asset-backed. 
Pure debt sukūk securities, which include the mudārabah contracts, are merely 
silent partnership: process of raising funds through loan-like contracts. Equity-
based contracts include mushārakah and diminishing mushārakah contracts 
and are similar to finite-term equity ownership for investors. Asset-backed 
sukūk contracts include the murābahah, ijārah, salam, and istisnāh. These are 
contracts that ownership of an asset is transferred to investors as a part of the 
fund raising process. 
Paper reviews major types of sukūk contracts (mudārabah, mushārakah, 
murābahah, salam, ijārah, and istisnāh ) by reviewing and summarizing the 
literature available on them and providing the best definition and highlighting 
their unique features and their structure. It also draws possible cash flow patterns 
pertaining to each form of contracts. 
To commence the more arduous task of building mathematical models 
of how the six sukūk instruments should be valued, we provide a very useful 
starting point, especially by charting the payoffs of each type of the general class 
of sukūk. This paper therefore is hoped to provide a clear understanding of the 
economic behavior that results from a different way of constructing the financial 
arrangement for working capital and long term capital under a more advanced 
socially responsible funding arrangement that limits too much borrowing, 
makes borrowing conditional on purpose, sharing risk while avoiding extreme 
uncertainty (which is the hallmark of 21st century finance) and clearly showing 
the payoff patterns to be different from those of conventional bond market 
behavior. 
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